

# Agenda

#### About me

- ✓ Part I High Level
  - The bigger picture
  - O What are the most common shortcomings?
  - Challenges during the disaster
  - Q&A
- Part II Low Level
  - O What is an AD disaster?
  - o How to back up AD?
  - AD Forest recovery plan
  - Suggested design for test environment for AD restore
  - Lessons learned
  - Q&A

#### About me


#### Rostyslav Yevdiukhin, aka Ross

- Have worked in HP (and by proxy in P&G), EDB/EVRY, IBM, Visma and now started consultant life in Experis. Have been working in IT for 20 years, last 12 with Identity. Core areas – AD/IAM, Infrastructure, ZTNA, PAM and especially the defense aspect of the above. Think attack, do defense.
- Originally from Ukraine, moved to Norway in 2011 with my family have wife and 2 kids, who are now 15 and 19.
- Work is my major hobby, but I don't mind travelling and doing various activities, from windsurfing to mushroom picking. Since the full scale invasion of Ukraine, joined a group organizing and leading the protests requesting more support to Ukraine. You can often meet me near Stortinget at 17:00 on workdays, 12:00 on weekends.
- https://www.linkedin.com/in/ross-ua/




# 1. High Level


 When you work in Identity, you will clearly see that Identity is in the middle of everything.




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- All other areas are dependent on proper functioning of IAM




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


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- Just like IAM is dependent on every other core infrastructure area
- Which becomes evident like never before when disaster happens on one of the services
- Every area normally has a DR plan to recover, so what's missing?



# Part I – High Level. Most common shortcomings.

- When problem start happening on more than 1 service, DR plans stop working
- DR plans are almost always assuming that all other parts are working
- When multiple areas are in disaster situation, the order of restore is not clear
- To restore any area, credentials are vital element.
   When IdP is not available, most DR plans will stop working





### Bonus: Large attack on Telecom company - Kyivstar


- 24M subscribers
- Core infrastructure damaged, including backups.
- Mobile network down, base stations damaged.
   Subscriber equipment damaged.
- Air raid alarms not working
- POS terminals and ATMs not working
- In some cities, street lighting had to be turned off manually



- 05:26 Attack started
- Information attack, claiming police raids on company offices







#### Exchange admin center

recipients

permissions

compliance management

organization

protection

mail flow

mobile

public folders


servers

hybrid

servers databases database availability groups virtual directories certificates



NAME	ACTIVE ON SERVER	SERVERS WITH COPIES	STATUS	BAD COPY COUNT		
oackup-e16-08	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-WHG01	Mounted	0	backup-e16-08	
backup-e19-01	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG20	Mounted	0	Dackup elo oo	
packup-e19-02	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2	Mounted	0	Database availability group:	
packup-e19-03	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG201	Mounted	0	exch2019dag	
ackup-e19-04-new	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-LV01	Mounted	0		
ackup-e19-05-new	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG2019-DGT01	Mounted	0	Servers	
ackup-e19-06-new	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-LV01	Mounted	0	EXCG2019-DGT01 EXCG2019-WHG01	
ackup-e19-07-new	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01	Mounted	0		
ackup-e19-09	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-DGT01	Mounted	0	Database copies	
ackup-e19-10	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-WHG01	Mounted	0	backup-e16-08\EXCG2019-DGT01 Active Mounted Copy queue length: 0 Content index state: NotApplicabl View details backup-e16-08\EXCG2019-WHG0 Passive Healthy Copy queue length: 0 Content index state: NotApplicabl	
ADB-01	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG20	Mounted	0		
ADB-02	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG20	Mounted	0		
MDB-03	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG201	Mounted	0		
MDB-04	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG20	Mounted	0		
ADB-05	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG20	Mounted	0		
MDB-06	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG201	Mounted	0		
MDB-07	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG20	Mounted	0		
MDB-08	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG20	Mounted	0	Suspend   Activate   Remove	
/IDB-09	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG201	Mounted	0	View details	
MD8-10	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01, EXCG2019-WHG01, EXCG20	Mounted	0		
ADB-11	EXCG2019-WHG01	EXCG2019-WHG01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG20	Mounted	0		
MDB-12	EXCG2019-DGT01	EXCG2019-DGT01,EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG201	Mounted	0		
estore-partial-backup-e16	EXCG2019-LV01	EXCG2019-LV01,EXCG2019-WHG01	Mounted	0		



# Bonus: Large attack on Telecom company - Kyivstar

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- Mobile network down, base stations damaged. Subscriber equipment damaged.
- Air raid alarms not working
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- •05:26 Attack started
- •Information attack, claiming police raids on company offices
- •08:04 First public announcement of disruptions
- •12:46 Announcement about hacker attack and complete downtime
- •15:55 Official statement from CEO
- •12.12.2023 20:00 Cable internet services mostly restored
- •14.12.2023 93% of mobile network restored for voice
- •15.12.2023 Mobile Internet restored
- •18.12.2023 SMS services restored
- •19.12.2023 Internet in Underground (metro) restored

•21.12.2023 All base services restored to normal

21.12

### Part I – High Level. Ransomware scenario


Imagine that everything is down and something is encrypted or damaged, CSIRT is assessing the damage and is determining safe restore points

- Are you able to login to your computer?
  - Need a plan if that is not available
- Are you able to communicate with your colleagues?
  - Need a backup communication channels
- Are you able to read the DR plans?
  - Need to store DR plans safe but accessible
- Are you able to get access to the Break-The-Glass accounts?
- Password vault should be available during the disaster
- What is necessary to bring back remote access system?
  - Need a plan with the order of restoration in case of total disaster



### Part I – High Level. Ransomware scenario - test

- Run tabletop exercise with the following audience:
  - Architects
  - □ Key operations personnel
  - Identity
  - Optionally include CSIRT for extended review
- Document gaps and issues
- Verify uncertain scenarios
- Provide input for architects to improve solutions
- Don't panic



# 2. Low Level


### Part II – Low Level. What is an AD disaster?

- AD has very robust, fool-proof design and recovery are rarely needed.
- There are many situations which can be called a disaster:
  - Mass removal of users or groups that needs to be reverted
  - Losing multiple domain controllers
- The real disaster would happen when:
  - All domain controllers are lost
  - AD database is corrupted beyond repair
  - o There's a need to roll-back the irreversible change
  - O Domain eats through 2B (2,147,483,647) RID pool




#### **Option 1**

- Microsoft has a documented procedure for restoring AD from the Full Backup with Windows Backup
  - Officially it only requires System State, but restoring system state on another server was not supported earlier
  - One of the best practices 5-7 years ago were to backup several Domain Controllers in the domain to a safe location
  - Afterwards, for long term storage a standard third-party backup can be used to pick up Windows Backup contents




#### **Option 2**

- Third-party agent-based backup, a classic (legacy) backup option
  - Must be tested, should not be expected to work until tested
  - How to restore from a complete loss? Install a fresh server, install agent, restore files and System State?
  - Authentication of agent to the backup server very important, passwords should be treated as Domain Admins




#### **Option 3**

- Hypervisor-level backup solution. Agent usually offered as an option
  - Provide the fastest way to recover a complete VM
  - Allows to skip System State restore and DSRM boot
  - Agent is not needed and best be avoided, to reduce attack surface
  - Must be tested




#### Keep security in mind

- Protect backup in each place of storage
  - Access to VM disk, credentials of backup agent from DCs, admins with access to backup console
  - People with access to DC backup should be considered Domain Admins (Tier 0)
  - Where possible, create a monitoring for events of access to backup files and attempts to restore
- Consider if you need to use agents and what benefits do they provide compared to built-in functionality (restoring group membership may be one of them)
- Test to see how restore works. Not tested = not existing





#### Feedback loop

- If there is no plan yet create a plan based on the available documentation. Estimate expected RTO for the following events:
  - Service partially restored some authentication will work, e.g. logon to different servers and applications
  - Service fully restored (service fully functional from client side)
- Log every action, its timestamp and any errors
- Analyze deviations
- Implement fixes
- Do another round of testing




#### Consider the following setup






- You will need a separate test domain or another production domain
- Virtual machine, member of test domain with RDS role to allow more than 2 concurrent RDP sessions
- RRAS (Remote Access) to route between networks
- Configuration on TestJump.contoso-test.com
  - NIC1 10.10.10.5, connected to company network, remove default gateway, add necessary routes manually using /32 netmask (monitoring, antivirus, patching, authentication, DNS)
  - NIC2 192.168.10.1, 192.168.0.1, 172.17.244.1,
     connected to local VM cluster network
  - Routing and Remote Access configured in routing mode
  - Before restore, place a virtual machine in and test that traffic is not leaving test environment



- Once a Domain Controller is restored, it will be in a simulation of production network. You don't need to change IP address – because it impacts testing.
- Restore VM for a Domain Controller just like you would restore in production, only place it on a Host/Cluster with TestJump server and make sure to connect to a host local network
- Connect with RDP to TestJump and from there use RDP to connect to the restored Domain Controller, no need for console
- You will be able to copy/paste/auto-type which may not work through VM Console
- Multiple sessions are possible several people working on several domains in parallel



- Once you are logged on, don't lock a screen or sign out
  - If you have a policy that is aggressively locking a screen, try changing it or overriding it with local policy
  - From Microsoft guide, regarding built-in Administrator account


This guide used to recommend disabling the account. This was removed as the forest recovery white paper makes use of the default administrator account. The reason is, this is the only account that allows logon without a Global Catalog Server.

- Don't use many special characters in DSRM passwords
  - Just make it 32 64 character long instead
- DNS another promise not fulfilled.
  - o Microsoft promises:

Moreover, as part of metadata cleanup, DC Locator DNS resource records for all other DCs in the domain will be deleted from DNS.

To help speed up DNS SRV record removal, run:

- nltest.exe /dsderegdns:server.domain.tld
- Truth is there is a lot of manual cleanup needed to remove DNS records from each
   AD Site, from various places under \_msdcs zone on each restored DC
- o DNS is the biggest challenge in restoring replication between domains



#### **Summary**

- The complexity of AD Forest Restore is way bigger than of most other applications
- Even when you have performed the recovery several times and you think you know what will happen – new things pop up unexpectedly
- Every time I did exercise with my team, we were so happy that it was not a real case scenario
- Doesn't matter how good is your Forest Recovery Plan you will always find challenges. And it is only experience that will help you in those cases



### Q&A

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